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1. Introduction
Today major civilian casualties and gross human rights violations are not the
result of interstate wars, but of what traditionally has been seen as intrastate conflicts. In
principle, because of being internal, these conflicts have been considered outside of the
valid course of action of the international community. The United Nations Charter is
clear. "[A] sovereign state is empowered by international law to exercise exclusive and
total jurisdiction within its territorial borders, and the other states have the corresponding
duty not to intervene in its internal affairs."1
Yet, haven't states also agreed on setting global standards of behavior concerning
human rights, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, and the Geneva Conventions, that
should specifically address these situations?
Commenting on this legal imbalance, Diehl et al. tell us that although one might
think that international law functions resembling Hart's classification of primary norms
and secondary rules, in which secondary rules serve to solve problems such as
inefficiency or uncertainty of primary norms, the conceptualization and functioning of the
international legal system is somehow different.
As the authors explain, it is easier to understand international law "as a dual
system for regulating interactions both generally and within specific areas,"2 or a system
that provides for both an operating and a normative system in ordering international
relations. As a normative system, international law guides international behavior by
identifying specific goals and values to be promoted and protected. As an operating

1
2

Evans et al. 2002, p. 102.
Diehl et al. 2009, p. 1.
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system, international law provides a supportive structure through which new norms and
rules are created, parameters for interaction established, and procedures and institutions
to solve potential conflicts determined.
In order to comprehend how international law functions, it is basic to keep in
mind that while through the years the tendency has been towards expansion in both of its
dimensions,3 4 it is precisely because of its Westphalian legacy - in which international
law is basically conceived as regulating interactions among, but not above, or within
states - that the operating system is not only more elaborated than the normative system,
but also, that some of its elements limit the progress of elements of its normative
counterpart.
Accordingly, the existence of imbalances between normative developments, and
the capacity of the international legal system to support the implementation of norms, are
not uncommon. The problem presents itself not only when new norms are created, but
lack "the appropriate processes and structures... to give [them full] effect",5 but also when
effective implementation appears to be 'incompatible' with previous norms or institutions
- a persistent setback.
As explained by Diehl et al., while existing imbalances can remain unresolved,
political shocks6 may facilitate operating system changes. However, in the absence of
international consensus, or when necessary operational changes run counter to the

3

In its operating dimension by increasing "the number of actors[,] forms of decision-making[, as well as]
forums and modes of implementation."
Ibid, p. 6.
4
In its normative dimension by increasing its depth and scope, especially in issue specific areas such as
human rights, where international law regulates behavior within states.
5
Diehl et al. 2009, p. 164.
6
According to Diehl et al. "political shocks can be discrete events, such as world wars, acts of terrorism, or
horrific human rights abuses [that] represent dramatic changes in the international political environment."
Diehl et al. 2003, p.57.
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interests of powerful states, political shocks can also give rise to extra-systemic
adaptation processes, such as soft law mechanisms.
Defined as "those that do not involve a formal legal obligation or legal processes,
but nevertheless represent a shared understanding or consensus about procedure or
behavior among the parties",7 soft law mechanisms are usually created to "provide for
both norms and their implementation when formal agreements are not possible or involve
issues that are heretofore considered domestic concerns."8 9
As pointed by Abbot et al., one of the main advantages of softer types of
legislation is to provide states with the opportunity to learn about emerging international
challenges and possible avenues for cooperation, thereby providing the international
community with a mechanism that can help to develop further consensus and
compromise among states. In this view, although soft law adaptations "do not ensure a
fully functioning legal system,10 they are in some cases superior to operating system
components designed to fulfill the same functions."11
As we will see through this thesis, emergence of the Responsibility to Protect
constituted a direct reaction to mass atrocities and evidence of the dynamic nature of the
international legal system, which, through the ongoing process of evolution of the human
rights regime, directly centers individuals and their inalienable rights as the main subjects
for protection at the national and international levels.
As a soft law mechanism based on strong normative foundations, and the
7

Diehl et al. 2009, p. 177.
Ibid.
9
Elaborating on this point Abbott et al. tell us that it is precisely because of the high sovereignty costs of
formal arrangements as well as the uncertain consequences that can derive from their application, that
states choose to cooperate through these types of legislation.
10
Since there may be some operating system gaps that are not address in their totality.
11
Diehl et al. 2009, p. 9.
8
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adaptation or re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as Responsibility, the Responsibility to
Protect provides a comprehensible response to a substantive question: how to reconcile
the institution of state sovereignty,12 fundamental for orderly relations among nations,
with agreed upon standards of behavior and humanitarian precepts, such as the
prohibition of genocide, which have reached the status of jus cogens norms.13
In this view, the Responsibility to Protect - or the primary responsibility of states
to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity, and the complementary responsibility of the international community
to assist states in fulfilling their responsibility, and to react by diplomatic and other
peaceful means, and only if necessary, through the use of force in accordance with the
United Nations Charter - represents not an idealistic solution, but a serious effort to
construct a coherent and realistic framework to better coordinate international institutions
and norms that initially appear as irreconcilable.

12

And its related principles such as non-interference.
Citing the International Court of Justice 1986 Nicaragua decision, Shelton tells us that ius cogens norms
are those "rules of international humanitarian law so fundamental to respect for the human person and
'elementary considerations of humanity' that 'they constitute intransgressible principles of international
customary law'."
Shelton 2009, p. 86.

13
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2. Research Design
2. 1 Hypothesis
Motivated by the divided positions that followed from the Security Council's
adoption of Resolution 1973,14 and its implementation by NATO, as well as by the
expanding debate on the role and utility of the Responsibility to Protect when considering
the international community's differing treatment of events currently unfolding in
countries like Syria and in Bahrain, the object of this thesis is to better understand what is
the Responsibility to Protect, what is the relationship between the developing framework
and greater compliance with international law, and what are its main contributions,
pending challenges and limitations.
I will argue that although the Responsibility to Protect has commonly been
defined as a norm or an emerging norm, such an understanding can lead to inaccurate
interpretations of what should be expected from the developing framework. Instead, I will
argue that it is better to understand the Responsibility to Protect as a soft law mechanism
aimed at facilitating compliance with previously agreed-to standards of behavior. As I
will seek to demonstrate, this interpretation is not only more realistic, when considering
that due to the high sovereignty costs involved in the framework15 it is probable that the
Responsibility to Protect will never reach full legalization, but is also more coherent,
when realizing that the most important contribution of the framework is not really legal
but political.

14

Concerning the situation of Libya.
Both of decision-making sovereignty in the case of powerful states and of territorial sovereignty in the
case of weaker ones
See Luck 2010, p. 362.

15
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2. 2 Methodology
This thesis will adopt a qualitative approach to analysis based on the use of case
studies, and the review of relevant literature, official documents such as United Nations
General Assembly declarations, Security Council resolutions and Secretary General
reports, as well as statements by member states representatives and UN officials.
Following Diehl et al.'s conceptualization of soft law mechanisms, the first part of
this thesis will revisit the political shocks that led to the emergence of the Responsibility
to Protect. After reviewing the international response to humanitarian crises in Somalia,
Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo during the nineteen nineties, I will explore the theoretical
foundations of the Responsibility to Protect: the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as
Responsibility, developed by Francis Deng during the mid-nineties, and the
Responsibility to Protect as conceived and presented to the world in 2001 by the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty.
Next, I will review the political efforts aimed at creating and advancing
international consensus on the framework, the negotiation process undertaken by states
within the United Nations system, and the language in which the Responsibility to Protect
was publicly acclaimed by world leaders at the World Summit in 2005. Over this basis I
will explore the steps that have been taken at the United Nations in order to implement
the Responsibility to Protect as an organizing framework for political action at the
international, regional and national levels. My thesis will conclude by identifying the
main contributions, pending challenges and the limitations of the Responsibility to
Protect.

9

3. Political Shocks
Understanding the circumstances that led to the emergence of the Responsibility
to Protect takes us back to the early nineties, a time that seemed like a historic moment
for the United Nations. The end of the Cold War allowed the organization to immerse
itself in vast regions of the world through diplomacy, mediation, and peace operations. In
addition, in 1991, the United Nations had coordinated an exemplary response to Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait.
Yet, despite talk of a 'new world order', images of peacekeepers as 'freedom
warriors', and the declaration by members of the Security Council in 1992 that social,
economic and even ecological crises could constitute threats falling within their
purview,16 events to happen in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia would soon
shake the organization.
As explained by Traub, in the excitement of the moment it had been easy to
overlook crucial facts. First, the dynamics and challenges of conflict prone areas were
changing dramatically in the context of the post-Cold War era. Second, the United
Nations "had no previous experience with the boiling madness of civil war."17 Third,
"Council members had made no serious effort to match the size and capacity"18 of
authorized operations to the environment in which peacekeepers were going to be
deployed. Fourth, "the United States had attained such global dominance with the
collapse of the Soviet empire that it could afford to act on its own, even if it preferred not
to."19

16

Chesterman 2002, p. 300.
Traub 2006, p. 60.
18
Ibid. p. 36.
19
Ibid, p. 25.
17
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3. 1 Somalia 1993
The United Nations presence in Somalia in 1992 constituted a direct application
of the Security Council's new approach to global security. In practice, although
intolerable in humanitarian terms, the Somali crisis did not present any type of threat to
international peace and security per se, but a threat to Somalis themselves. In addition,
UNOSOMs20 initial contingent numbered five hundred Pakistani peacekeepers, who as
pointed out by Traub, were being deployed in the middle of a 'madhouse' run by
contending factions.
After the totality of UNOSOMs personnel were held down at Mogadishu's airport
by forces loyal to the chief warlord Mohammed Aideed, former Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali asked the United States government for needed support in order to
carry out the operation. Amazingly, "[h]aving already lost his re-election bid"21 President
George H. Bush authorized the unthinkable, and "[a]n astonishing thirty-seven thousand
troops, twenty-eight thousand of them American, [took] over the job from the five
hundred Pakistanis."22
Yet, even with this reinforcement, UNOSOMs mission would prove
unsustainable. The operation had been conceived as a patchy response to the Somali
crisis, and its mandate only encompassed the distribution of humanitarian aid to civilians
by keeping contending factions at bay. With no American national interests involved, and
the mission's goals seemingly accomplished, the Clinton administration was eager to pull
out American troops. Re-considering these issues, the Security Council authorized a new
operation in March, 1993.
20

United Nations Operation in Somalia.
Traub 2006, p. 37.
22
Ibid.
21
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Ironic, when thinking that the contingent that was going to replace American
troops was worse trained and armed that its predecessor, the mission's mandate was
broadened. This time the operation's goals aimed not only at ensuring the flow of
humanitarian aid to civilians, but also at disarming contending factions, and at starting to
rebuild the Somali State.
Not surprisingly, in June 1993, once ten thousand US Marines had left, "Aideed's
troops ambushed two Pakistani units, killing twenty-six" peacekeepers.23 The next day,
responding to what seemed like an attack on the United Nations, the Security Council
authorized "all necessary precautions against all those responsible for armed attacks".24
The consequences of this authorization would prove disastrous.
Acting outside of the mission's mandate, eighteen US Army Rangers died while
trying to capture Aideed's closest men. This signified high costs for the Clinton
administration since the operation had been orchestrated by the United States Special
Operations Command in Florida, not the United Nations. For Somalis, the operation
meant the deaths of thousands of civilians, thus ending all support from the local
population. For the United Nations, "Somalia was a profound shock to the system:"25 the
whole Mogadishu experience had demonstrated that the organization was both
unprepared, and unable to operate in a coherent way in the context of a failed state.

3. 2 Rwanda 1994
The United Nations presence in Rwanda started as a part of a wider effort in the
Central African region aimed at persuading rival groups to lay down arms, and to manage
23

Ibid, p. 38.
Ibid.
25
Ibid, p. 39.
24
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internal conflict by accepting "systems of power sharing."26
By August, 1993, the Arusha Accords had been signed by President
Habyarimana, representing the Hutu government, and by the RPF,27 a Tutsi rebel group
that had accumulated considerable military gains in the northern part of the country since
the beginning of the Rwandan Civil War in 1990. The parties had agreed to start working
on their differences, and to a ceasefire line to be monitored by the United Nations.
Yet unfortunate dynamics were already developing. First, Security Council
members again were underestimating the size of the contingent that was required to
accomplish the mission's goals. Although the United Nations Department of
Peacekeeping had initially estimated that UNAMIR28 would require the presence of
twelve hundred men, pressed by the increasing costs of peace operations, the Security
Council authorized the deployment of a force of only eight hundred. Second and more
importantly, the real risk in Rwanda, the Interahamwe, a militia group composed mainly
of Hutu radicals who felt President Habyarimana was compromising too much just by
negotiating with Tutsis, had not been a party to the peace agreement, and because of that,
they were considered out of the mandate or scope of action of UNAMIR. Third, because
of Somalia, the institution and its members, specially the United States, were in denial.
Neither detailed information coming from UNAMIR's Commander, Romeo
Dallaire, in January 1994 on the emerging dynamics on the ground and on the atrocities
that were about to happen, nor that the extermination of Tutsis and of moderate Hutus
since the beginning of April was becoming systematic, was able to modify the
organization's passive approach to the conflict or its humanitarian consequences. Instead,
26

Ibid, p. 51.
Rwandan Patriotic Front.
28
United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda.
27
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the Peacekeeping Department 'explained' to Dallaire that the overriding consideration of
peacekeeping missions was to avoid the use of force. He was explicitly reminded that the
scope of UNAMIR's mandate did not contemplate actions such as seizing illegal arms
from the Interahamwe, or providing protection to civilians!
On April 6th, facilitated by the lack of any type of coherent action by the United
Nations, and after a missile had blown up President Habyarimana's plane, "the killing
began within hours."29 In a desperate effort on April 7th, Dallaire contacted the
Peacekeeping Department with a last minute plan to persuade moderate Hutus to organize
against the Interahamwe. Sadly, he was again told that it was imperative, in light of the
disaster that had just occurred in Somalia, that UNAMIR did not take sides.
From that point on, events in Rwanda followed exactly the path that had been
delineated a couple of months earlier in Dallaire's cable to the Secretariat. On April 10th,
a group of ten Belgian peacekeepers was killed by the Interahamwe. Reacting to the
episode, Belgians and Americans began advocating for withdrawal of the operation. With
the situation rapidly deteriorating Boutros Boutros Ghali implored Council members to
stop the violence by authorizing the use of force on April 19th. Yet facilitated by a lack
of international consensus on how to proceed, and if to proceed,30 the Secretary General's
plea was highly questioned.
Even by the last days of April, when estimates of victims were close to five
hundred thousand, "and the newspapers and airwaves were filled with accounts of

29

Traub 2006, p. 55.
As Traub tells us, member states seemed to be divided into several groups. The first was formed by many
developing countries that had been persuaded by the Rwandan representative to the UN that the RPF was to
be blamed for increasing levels of violence in his country. A second group of states was inclined to believe
that Rwandans' lack of cooperation with UNAMIR justified the closing of the mission. Finally, countries
that had contributed troops to the mission expressed deep concerns for the security of their nationals.

30
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unspeakable savagery[,] the UN continued to behave as if Rwanda represented a
conventional problem of political reconciliation."31 It was not until May that the
Secretary General was clear enough and used the term genocide. Shamefully, "the
Clinton administration was by then twisting itself into rhetorical knots" to avoid using the
term for fear that this somehow would imply the automatic implementation of
"provisions of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, which requires signatories to 'prevent and punish' such crimes."32
Finally, by the beginning of May, the Security Council had agreed to task the
United Nations Secretariat with the development of an unofficial plan to reinforce the
mission. Inside of Rwanda, Dallaire proposed an additional contingent of fifty-five
hundred men to be deployed in areas where Tutsis had concentrated. His plan was clear,
and from the ground it made perfect sense. Contrary to the situation in Somalia where the
danger was coming from well armed factions, in Rwanda, it was "a bunch of thugs armed
with machetes"33 that was slaughtering masses.
Yet, invoking the disaster in Somalia, the United States opposed Dallaire's plan.
Instead, the Clinton administration proposed logistic support to implement a different
operation. As United States' officials explained to the Peacekeeping Department,
Rwandans at risk had already left the country and they could be protected in refugee
camps outside of Rwanda. But the strategy made no sense since Dallaire was describing
how thousands were being massacred per day. By May 17th, the United States finally
agreed on a resolution, and the Security Council authorized the deployment of only eight
hundred men.
31

Traub 2006, p. 57.
Ibid.
33
Ibid, p. 58.
32
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At this point, as Traub explains, not even this weak gesture mattered "since
neither Rwanda's neighbors nor any of the usual peacekeeping sources were willing to
send soldiers into the Central African cauldron".34 Fortunately, on May 19th, the RPF, led
by Paul Kagame, was able to take the capital, Kigali, and declared a ceasefire. Ironically,
a month later, when a new government had already been established, the Peacekeeping
Department received "the first pledge of troops"35 from a couple of states.
In the end, the 'ugly truth' was that members of the international community had
"little responsibility to protect the lives of the victims of an ongoing genocide."36 As for
the United Nations, the operation in Rwanda constituted the worst failure in the whole
history of the organization.37 Although in Somalia, decisions taken had gone extremely
wrong, in Rwanda, "where 800,000 people were slaughtered in one hundred days,"38 the
United Nations had been unable in effect to intervene at all.

3. 3 Bosnia 1992-1995
Calls for United Nations presence in the ethnically diverse Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia had started in November, 1991, when "army troops had
massacred civilians in the Croatian town of Vukorvar."39 Croatia's Parliament had
declared independence in June of that year, and Yugoslavia's Serb President, Slobodan

34

Ibid.
Ibid. p. 59.
36
Ibid.
37
Revisiting the events in Rwanda, an independent inquiry observed: "While UNAMIR [had been]
established to monitor a peace agreement, 'the onslaught of the genocide should have led decision-makers
in the United Nations [...] to realize that the original mandate, and indeed the neutral mediating role of the
United Nations, was no longer adequate and required a different, more assertive response, combined with
the means necessary to take such action'."
Ibid.
38
Ibid, pp. 50-51.
39
Ibid, p. 42.
35
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Milosevic, had launched a military campaign supposedly aimed at ensuring the unity of
the Federation. By December, a small group of United Nations unarmed military
observers had been deployed to monitor a ceasefire line that had been negotiated by the
European Union.
Yet, even before authorizing any type of armed operation, Secretary General
Boutros Boutros Ghali expressed his discomfort with the idea of the organization's
presence in the Balkans. In his view, not only were there so many other, more terrible
conflicts around the world, but this was "a white man's war",40 thus a European problem.
In turn, although Lord Carrington41 had commented that "the hour of Europe [had]
come",42 it seemed like Europeans were only willing to be the protagonists of the
diplomatic effort. It was clear from French and British statements that support from the
ground was to be assumed by the United Nations.
Calls for the deployment of peacekeepers to Bosnia started in April, 1992, when
the Yugoslav Army and Serbian paramilitary forces surrounded Sarajevo. After
dispatching an envoy to the area, the Secretary General informed the Security Council
that since there was no peace to keep, conditions were not ripe for sending in
peacekeepers. Nevertheless, in June UNPROFOR43 was enlarged to include infantry. As
stated by the Council, in resolution 761, the mission's goals would be "to ensure the
security and functioning of Sarajevo's airport and the delivery of humanitarian
assistance"44 to civilians.
After the shelling of Srebrenica's market, Council members agreed on the
40

Ibid, p. 43.
Chief negotiator for the European Union in the Balkans.
42
Traub 2006, p. 42.
43
United Nations Protection Force
44
S/RES/761, June 29, 1992.

41
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establishment of a safe area around the town, to be protected by peacekeepers.
Considering increasing levels of ethnic violence, the idea of safe havens was later
extended to incorporate four towns with predominately Muslim populations.
Since this task was unprecedented for peacekeepers, UNPROFOR officials began
questioning the implementation of the policy. As seen by the mission's commander, the
idea of safe areas implied that peacekeepers had to side openly with one of the parties to
the conflict. Nevertheless, in order to follow the Council's orders, he requested an
additional seventy thousand troops. Boutros Boutros Ghali then presented two plans to
the Council. The first one was constructed in terms of UNPROFORs request, the second,
to deploy a small number of peacekeepers, and to back them with the threat of air strikes.
The Council adopted the second approach and authorized an additional contingent of
seventy-six hundred men. The decision proved catastrophic.
In effect, although the protection of endangered populations within safe areas had
been conceived as a 'temporary' option, which meant "until the Serbs accepted the socalled Vance-Owen peace plan",45 when the plan failed, ethnic violence rose, but air
strikes did not follow, the policy became counterproductive. Not only were Serbs getting
the message that the United Nations was bluffing, but with lightly armed peacekeepers,
Bosnian Muslims had become easy targets!
Moreover, increasing violence was facilitated, in practice, by a mute Secretariat,
and divided Council members. As early as 1994, protected towns such as Srebrenica,
Gorazde, and Bihac were becoming outright 'killing zones', yet neither the Secretary
General nor the Security Council would do anything about it until mid-1995.
Serb forces launched the final assault on Srebrenica on July 6, 1995. The town fell
45

Traub 2006, p. 45.
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on July 11th after desperate calls from Dutch peacekeepers for air support were ignored.
Traub described the scene:

[I]t was clear that something terrible [happened] to the town's Muslim population: the Serbs had
deported women, children and the elderly. [Initially] '4000 draft-aged males' could not be accounted for[...]
In the end, the Bosnian Serbs killed about seventy-four hundred men and boys - by far the greatest atrocity
in Europe since World War II.46

Shamefully, only after Milosevic's forces had crossed the last possible line by
successfully implementing his ethnic-cleansing policy, did Security Council members
concur on how to proceed. In an emergency meeting on July 21st, allied leaders agreed
that NATO "would no longer give the UN a veto over bombing decisions."47 Soon after
Serbian militias encircled the rest of the protected areas, the Clinton administration
communicated its intention to start the air campaign with, or without European support.
On August 30th, two days after a Serb explosive killed thirty-seven more people in
Sarajevo, NATO strikes began. Operation Deliberate Force would continue "until the
Bosnian Serb leadership... signed a draft of a peace agreement two weeks later."48

3. 4 Kosovo 1999
Calls for the United Nations to be a presence in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia started in 1998. Yet, Kosovo was not going to become a United Nations
issue.49
46

Ibid, p. 49.
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
At least initially.
47
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Since the beginning of the year, facilitated by an increasing number of weapons
flowing from Albania, Kosovars were moving from peaceful resistance to Milosevic's
rule, to a more militarized stance towards the Yugoslav government. At the same time,
Serb forces were moving from retaliating against KLA50 leaders and their families, to
collective punishments towards predominately Albanian and Muslim populations.
Despite an active Secretariat51 that started calling attention to the escalating
conflict as early as May, Russia, a historical Serb ally, which at the time was facing
similar problems in Chechnya, was determined to protect Milosevic's rule over the Serb
Province.
Indeed, the Russians were very clear. In September, when the Security Council
was able to pass a resolution declaring that increasing levels of ethnic violence
constituted a threat to international peace and security, "demanding that Serb forces be
confined to their garrison, and [calling on the parties to seek] a negotiated solution to
Kosovo's bid for secession[, t]he Russian ambassador insisted that the resolution did not
authorize force should Serbs fail to comply."52
In October, pressed by threats of NATO's air strikes, Milosevic declared he would
cooperate with the Council's resolution by allowing observers. Yet, "the Serbs were not
about to be deterred by unarmed monitors [and t]he violence, the bouts of ethnic
cleansing, grew more brutal."53 This time however, Milosevic was seriously
miscalculating the limits of the Clinton administration's patience.

50

Kosovo Liberation Army.
Kofi Annan was elected Secretary General of the United Nations in December, 1996. Previously he had
served as head of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations since 1993. That experience had greatly
molded his position on the issue.
52
Traub 2006, p. 94.
53
Ibid, p. 95.

51
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By mid January, having no intention on waiting until the Council's paralysis
would diffuse, as in Bosnia, and responding to the assassination of forty-five Kosovars in
the town of Racak, "NATO began to prepare its war machinery, while the Bosnia Contact
Group[,]54 which had been coordinating diplomatic efforts, called for a last-ditch attempt
at negotiations."55
Once diplomacy at Rambouillet failed, Paul Heinbecker, Canadian Ambassador to
the United Nations and then President of the Security Council, tried for the last time to
persuade Council members to authorize a collective enforcement operation. Determined
to stop Milosevic, and conscious of Russia's intention to continue to exercise its veto,
NATO launched its seventy-two day long bombing campaign on March 24, 1999.

54
55

Composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Russia.
Traub 2006, p. 95.
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4. Trying to Start the Debate
In the aftermath of Kosovo, with the world divided between those who felt that
NATO's unauthorized intervention to save Kosovar Albanians had been legitimate, and
the majority of states who thought of it as having disastrous consequences for the
international order that the United Nations had helped to build since 1945,56 former
Secretary General Kofi Annan decided to make human security and intervention the
themes of his next report to the General Assembly in September of 1999.

[In his speech,] Annan argued that the State was the servant of the people and that the 'sovereignty
of the individual' was enhanced by a growing respect of human rights. State sovereignty therefore implied a
responsibility to protect individual sovereigns. The role of the UN was to assist states in their fulfillment of
their responsibilities and achievement of their sovereignty. This much was clearly set out in the UN
Charter, Annan reiterated. The question however, was one of how to determine the 'common interest' in
particular cases. In a case such as that of Kosovo, did sovereignty as responsibility require intervention,
and, if so, who was entitled to take this decision? Answering his own questions, Annan [focused on three
critical points.] First, a principle of intervention should be 'fairly and consistently applied'. Second, it
should embrace a 'more broadly defined, more widely conceived definition of national interest'. In other
words[,] decision-makers should make decisions on the basis of the common good not on the basis of
national interests. Third, the proper authority was the Security Council, but the Council should accept its
responsibilities and make a commitment to respond to humanitarian emergencies.57

56

Article 2 section (4) of the United Nations Charter establishes that [a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
The only exceptions to this rule are self-defense, or Security Council authorization in accordance with
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
57
Bellamy 2009, pp. 31-32.
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Not surprisingly, Annan's approach was not only questioned58 but formally
repudiated. As stated by the G77, "the doctrine of humanitarian intervention [was] an
unacceptable violation of state sovereignty."59
Yet, Annan's initial failure was the beginning of a bigger effort.60 A year later, the
Secretary General reiterated his message in his 2000 Millennium Summit Report, and
"[a]t the 2000 convening of the General Assembly, Canadian Prime Minister Jean
Chretien announced that he would impanel a commission to study the issues that Annan
had raised."61
This commission, that became known as the International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) would be responsible for reframing the terms
of the debate by developing the concept of the Responsibility to Protect. However,
because the Responsibility to Protect is built over the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty
as Responsibility, the next section will first explore Deng's work.
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5. Re-conceptualizing Sovereignty
Through the nineteen nineties, the realization that the end of the Cold War
revealed a vacuum of responsibility for the management of internal conflicts and their
humanitarian consequences, and that the United Nations was failing to adapt to the
emerging challenges and dynamics of conflict prone areas, confronted the international
community with a substantive dilemma - how to bridge the gap between international
ideals, such as the protection of basic rights, and on-the-ground realities in sovereign
countries such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda, where internal conflicts
and gross human rights violations had been fueled by state failure or partisan authorities'
unwillingness to protect segments of the population.
Because, in principle, providing local solutions to local problems counts for a
high degree of legitimacy, and because, in practice, external assistance to safeguard
effectively populations in need of protection is greatly facilitated by governments'
cooperation, the challenge "is one of how to negotiate sovereignty, how to engage
governments in a constructive dialogue that would bridge sovereignty and responsibility,
that would turn sovereignty from being a barricade against the outside world, into a
positive challenge of a state's responsibility for its people,"62 and to do it within a
framework able to unite state responsibility and accountability into a principle for
political action, at both the national and international levels.

5.1 From Sovereignty as Control to Sovereignty as Responsibility
To explain the basis for conceptualizing Sovereignty as Responsibility, Deng et
al. start from the premise that the institution of state sovereignty is to be understood in its
62
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historical context. Indeed, although established in the post-Thirty Years War in Europe
through the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, sovereignty has advanced through at least four
overlapping phases.
Sovereignty "was initially conceived as an instrument of authoritative control by
the monarch over feudal princes in the construction of modern territorial states."63
Accordingly, the basic premise of this period was that the primary goal of the state 64 was
to "maintain order through an effective exercise of sovereignty."65 Utilized in this
context, sovereignty was understood by legal scholars like Austin, as an attribute of
power, which placed authority above the law, law being a reflection of the sovereign's
will. In other words, sovereign rule was absolute and not to be constrained, and although
restrictions to authority were possible, they would result from acts or discretion of the
sovereign.
The second phase in the development of sovereignty can be dated to 1945. "[T]he
Nuremberg trials and the mounting humanitarian and human rights movement following
World War II represent a clear demarcation line for the erosion of sovereignty."66 The
legal dispute in 1945 and 1946 was not if Nazi atrocities committed during war time
constituted crimes against humanity, but if it was necessary or not to pass new legislation
to declare Nazi law illegal retroactively. As posited by those such as Hart, retroactive
legislation was necessary. Contrariwise, basing his views on the intrinsic ethics of law,
Fuller contended that Nazi "laws had so violated the fundamental principles of morality
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and human dignity as to have ceased to be law."67
Prompted by the level of destruction, as well as by the humanitarian costs
resulting from the war, the United Nations was created not only as an organization to
promote friendly relations among nations, and to enforce the prohibition of the use of
force in international relations, but also to promote human rights standards, their
protection, and to facilitate human rights law codification. As posited by Buergenthal,
despite the vagueness of the human rights provisions set forth in the United Nations
Charter, articles 1(3), 55 and 56 proved to have important effects.68 "In time, the
membership of the United Nations came to accept the proposition that the Charter had
internationalized the concept of human rights."69
Explaining this process, Deng et al. tell us that although not fully elaborated, basic
human rights norms were adopted by member states around the United Nations system
via the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
This corpus of law provides the basis for the essential premise of human rights law. In
simple terms, "to qualify for the name of government, a government now has to meet
certain standards, all of which involve restraints in the use of power: no torture, no
67
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brutalization... no state terror... no discrimination... and so on."70 In other words, these
agreed-to responsibilities by sovereign states imply acknowledging "[h]umanity [as] the
raison d'etre of any legal system",71 recognizing that many states were failing in fulfilling
their "primary function, namely the protection and development of the human dignity of
the individual,"72 and accepting that "the normative principles of governance should
emphasize state protection for the individual [both through] the provision of the essential
requirements of life,"73 and through the protection of basic human rights.
These premises not only "impose on the international community a correlative
responsibility for their enforcement,"74 but constituted the basis for operation of the right
of self-determination during the decolonization process. As Deng et al. tell us, sanctions
against apartheid practices in South Africa were an effective measure to expand
sovereignty as responsibility, a process which has been reinforced in time, by increasing
waves of democratization, as well as by the increasing codification of international law
instruments within the United Nations system.
In effect, sovereignty finds limits, and at the same time expands in specific areas,
through ratification of international agreements such as the Convention on the Prevention
and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. These
treaties are legally binding and provide a valid and legitimate base for United Nations
practices such as "on-site monitoring and visits, criticism, condemnations, sanctions and
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even armed intervention."75
As demonstrated by post-Cold War dynamics, the advancement and expansion of
the human rights regime have been impressive. When compared to the Cold War era, the
nineteen nineties had been characterized by an explosion of humanitarian assistance
missions, and peacekeeping operations authorized by the United Nations Security
Council.
However, precisely because the issue of humanitarian intervention represents the
greatest erosion to the traditional conceptualization of sovereignty, is that the third phase
of its evolution "emerged as a reactive assertion of sovereignty by governments whose
domestic performance renders them vulnerable to international scrutiny."76 Still, even
supporters of a more liberal conceptualization of sovereignty admitted the existing
tension between the expansion of sovereignty as responsibility, and the erosion of state
sovereignty as a fundamental institution to facilitate peaceful relations among nations.77
As questioned by former Secretary General Perez de Cuellar in 1991, after affirming the
irreversible expansion of humanitarian and human rights standards: "[D]on't these
premises call into question one of the cardinal principles of international law, one
diametrically opposed to it, namely, the obligation of non-interference in the internal
affairs of States?"78 79
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Answering this question a few years later, former Secretary General Boutros
Boutros Ghali argued for the need to balance the international community's concerns with
the need of good governance at the level of states. In this view, at the same time that
fulfillment of sovereign responsibilities had become the best way to protect national
sovereignty, broader cooperation was still necessary.80 81
This perspective takes us to the current period in the development of sovereignty a period characterized by a pragmatic effort to reaffirm the centrality of the institution as
well as to clarify its parameters.

5. 2 Sovereignty as Responsibility as an Individual and Collective Framework

[In simple terms, conceptualizing Sovereignty as Responsibility, means] to recognize internal
conflicts and their consequences as falling within the domestic jurisdiction and therefore national
sovereignty of the country concerned. However, it is also recognized, that sovereignty carries with it certain
responsibilities for which governments must be held accountable. And that they are accountable not only to
their national constituencies but ultimately to the international community. In other words, by effectively
discharging its responsibilities for good governance, a state can legitimately claim protection for its
national sovereignty.82

Sovereignty as Responsibility as a standard for government behavior is especially

settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement
measures under Chapter VII.
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relevant in the context of conflict prone areas in Africa, where, as Deng et al. tell us, the
absence of adequate institutions to manage diversity during the post-independence period
made "conflict over power wealth, and development"83 unavoidable.
As the authors explain, misunderstood post-colonial objectives84 resulted in
policies that essentially led to pervasive patterns characterized by "gross violations of
human rights, denial of civil liberties, disruption of economic and social life, and
consequent frustration of development."85
The case of Rwanda, where Hutus are the majority of the population, provides a
good example to illustrate this point. After independence in 1962, Tutsi domination, that
had been reinforced by brutal colonial administrations, was simply replaced by Hutu
repression. After all, the RPF was composed basically of Tutsi refugees who, since
independence, had been escaping from Hutu government persecution and suppressive
practices.

[Learning the lessons from Rwanda suggests that] it is not the differences in identity, whether real
or perceived, that generate conflict, but rather the implications of those differences in terms of equitable
access to power and resources, social services, development opportunities and the enjoyment of
fundamental rights and freedoms.
Seen in this light, early prevention becomes a challenge of good governance and equitable
management of diversity. That means eliminating gross inequalities, discrimination and promoting a
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common sense of belonging, a responsibility that all states... have towards their people.86

It is precisely because of this responsibility of governments, that sovereignty
"becomes a pooled function to be protected when exercised responsibly, and to be shared
when help is needed."87 In other words, Sovereignty as Responsibility conceptualizes a
framework based on cooperation, in which members of the international community
exercise responsibilities in the form of increasing 'layers of assistance', in the event of
incapacity or reluctance of national authorities to govern.
Precisely because many internal conflicts are embedded in regional ones, and
because domestic instability has the potential of spreading to one's neighborhood, is that
regional and sub-regional organizations, as well as neighbors, are the first called to share
responsibility by constructively guiding members, or neighbors, by assisting them in
fulfilling their responsibilities, and by responding in the most appropriate manner when
required.
Ultimately, because it is a stated mission of the United Nations to create the
"conditions of stability and well-being which are necessary for peaceful and friendly
relations among nations",88 and because one of its stated purposes is to achieve
international cooperation in solving international problems of a humanitarian character by
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights,89 the United Nations is called upon
to actively advance and support sovereignty as shared responsibility as a framework for
political action at the national and international levels.
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In this respect, considering that the goal is to create a coherent and effective
system able to assist states and to protect populations, sharing responsibility requires the
United Nations to take the lead in at least four specific areas.
First, considering that there is still debate "whether or not existing law provides
adequate basis for a comprehensive system of international protection and assistance"90
for endangered populations, it is crucial to restate existing obligations contained in
agreed-to international instruments in order "to clarify the legal bases and introduce any
reforms."91
Second, considering that the political will of international actors is essential to
provide protection and assistance for populations in need, "the formulation of guiding
principles may be as important, if not more so, as the promulgation of legally binding
standards."92
Third, considering that interventions in the name of humanitarian purposes were
abused by powerful nations in the past, the United Nations should state coherent
principles for the use of force when the goal is to protect populations, and should have
the main "responsibility for determining the existence of humanitarian crises that
threatened international peace and security or otherwise justify international action."93
Fourth, and perhaps the most important, considering that Western engagement in
ongoing crisis is frequently prompted by "the gravity of the tragedies involved",94 direct
preventive efforts, as well as structural prevention measures, need to be stressed and
further developed.
90

Deng et al. 1996, p. 28.
Ibid.
92
Ibid, p. 29.
93
Ibid.
94
Ibid.
91

32

Finally, the United Nations is called upon to play an active role in the areas of
conflict prevention and conflict resolution by utilizing all tools at its disposal. As Deng et
al. tell us, such a quest had already been outlined by Boutros Boutros Ghali. In his view,
the goals of the United Nations should be considered with a broad perspective including:
to identify conflict prone situations at their earliest possible stages, and to intervene by
utilizing diplomatic tools; to engage in peacemaking when conflict initially erupted; to
preserve peace through peacekeeping operations, and to provide assistance to parties to
implement agreed-to peace frameworks; and to assist in peace-building initiatives, in the
form of institutional reform, infrastructure recovery, or national reconciliation measures.
As explained by Deng et al., what "is envisaged can be conceptualized as a threephase strategy that would include monitoring the development to draw early attention to
impending crises, interceding in time to avert the crises through diplomatic initiatives,
and mobilizing international action when necessary."95
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6. Reframing the Terms of the Debate
Aiming to achieve consensus on a legitimate and comprehensive strategy through
which the international community could reconcile the so called 'sovereigntyintervention' dilemma, Canada's Prime Minister announced the creation of the ICISS in
September, 2000. As noted by Canada's Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, "[t]he ICISS
was to outline appropriate and politically feasible international responses to massive
human rights violations and to set ways of preventing such violations."96
Precisely because what was needed was the strongest possible consensus,
commissioners were selected from all regions. The ICISS was chaired by Gareth Evans97
and Mohamed Sahnoun,98 from Australia and Algeria respectively. Of the other ten
commissioners, five represented Western countries,99 and five represented the far flung
South Africa, Guatemala, the Philippines, India and Russia. To promote further
international participation, the ICISS "organized a series of 11 roundtables and national
consultations attended by the commissioners and participants from the academy,
governments and non-governmental sector."100 Furthermore, in order to take advantage of
similar efforts, the commission also engaged with parallel working groups such as the
Rio Group and the Pugwash Study Group.
As pointed out by Bellamy, although positions previously taken in the Pugwash
Group's workshops of late 1999 and September, 2000 by delegates of countries such as
China, "painted a gloomy picture for the ICISS,"101 they were also indicative that even
96
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the strongest adversaries of humanitarian intervention were not opposed to it in all cases.
In this respect, the challenge was to agree on which situations triggered the necessity of
international reaction, as well as to clarify the procedure, and to identify the right
authority to make those decisions. The delegates of the Pugwash Study Group had also
deemed crucial that to effectively respond to emerging challenges, timely reaction was
just one of the capacities that needed to be further developed and perfected. In the
delegates' views, 'intervention' should be understood "as one stage in a continuum of
international support for efforts to prevent and limit human suffering."102
Accordingly, much of the focus of the ICISS centered on what the Pugwash and
Rio Groups identified as most relevant: "criteria for intervention, institutions/authority
and modalities."103

6. 1 The Road to the ICISS Report
The ICISS met for the first time in Ottawa on January 15, 2001. Considering the
terms of the post-Kosovo debate, and the nature of the issues at stake, Evans and
Sahnoun announced that, following the example of the Brundtland Commission - which
during the late eighties had coined the term 'sustainable development' - the goal of the
ICISS was to develop a framework able to transcend the negative perceptions of
intervention, when the intent or purpose was to assist and protect endangered populations.
Humanitarian intervention as an expression needed to be replaced for at least for two
reasons. First, humanitarian agencies insisted that the term 'humanitarian' should not be
used to refer to any type of action that implied acts of war. Second, commissioners such
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as Ramesh Thakur from India, rightly argued that the term itself had negative historical
connotations.
During the Ottawa meeting, commissioners also expressed their views on the
utility of establishing criteria for the use of force, as well as on the modalities for
preventing and responding to mass atrocities. On the first point, some commissioners
argued that the development of guiding principles for decision-makers could be helpful,
but others were skeptical. On the issue of modalities, the commissioners agreed on the
necessity of coordination among "civilian and military agencies in developing long-term
strategies to prevent massive human suffering."104
Before the beginning of the commission's second meeting, to be held in Geneva,
Evans "came up with the idea of reframing the debate in terms of a 'responsibility to
protect'."105 As it was presented by Evans, the idea was able to clarify and resolve four
issues that had been raised previously:

First, the almost exclusive focus on military intervention was misplaced. If the aim was to
strengthen international protection for basic human rights, it was necessary to consider a much wider
continuum of activities. Second, resistance to humanitarian intervention was grounded in legitimate
historical sensitivities about colonialism and self-determination. Third, the search for new legal rules to
govern intervention was not a promising avenue of enquiry. Not only was the possibility of consensus slim,
but new legal rules would not guarantee the protection of endangered peoples. Finally, more attention
should be given to the responsibilities of different actors.106

In Geneva, the commissioners again focused on the issues of criteria and
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modalities. Perhaps the most important contribution of the gathering was the participants'
agreement that not only the prevention of mass atrocities was crucial but, if military
intervention for human protection was to take place, "long-term plans for rebuilding after
conflict"107 were necessary. Yet, concerned that the responsibility to rebuild could be
seen as a form of neo-colonialism by intervention opponents, the commissioners stressed
that "rebuilding around local empowerment"108 provided the right answer.
After the conclusion of the Geneva meeting, the issue of the utility of criteria on
the use of force in the event of military intervention began to create divisions among the
commissioners. Representing views from the developing world, Thakur argued that the
existence of guiding principles was necessary not to legitimize intervene actions, but to
"actually restrain intervention."109 Taking the argument further, participants at the New
Dehli roundtable not only reiterated the necessity of guiding criteria, but for their
application only "by a legitimate and representative body [adding] that a reformed
Security Council was the best candidate for this role."110
Yet the West remained skeptical. As noted by some during the London
roundtable, the existence of criteria would play no significant role in shaping the political
behavior of Security Council members. Others rejected altogether the idea of establishing
criteria for intervention on the basis of this being an intrinsically divisive matter. Also, as
pointed out by French officials during the Paris roundtable, the existence of criteria could
be counterproductive, as it could encourage groups to increase existent levels of violence
in order to capture international attention.
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Commissioners and roundtables participants also expressed differing views on
"which institutions had the authority to sanction the use of force or other coercive
measures."111 Although everybody agreed that the Security Council had the main
responsibility to authorize enforcement operations, some participants at the Maputo
roundtable expressed reservations about the idea that the Council be the only source of
authority, pointing to cases in which regional organizations had acted in the absence of
Council authorization such as ECOWAS intervention in Liberia, which had been ratified
a posteriori by the Council. "Regional measures also prompted the delegates at St.
Petersburg to refrain from denouncing all non-UN sanctioned interventions, primarily
because Russia had itself intervened in several conflicts in the former Soviet space
through the Commonwealth of Independent States."112
Only during the Washington roundtable did some participants argue that Security
Council authorization was not necessary, but preferable. Defenders of this view posited
that in cases of unauthorized intervention, the operation could be legitimized if the
guiding criteria on the use of force had been met.
During the Paris roundtable, Hubert Vedrine posited that while unauthorized
intervention might be the only option in some cases, the real challenge was not one of
how to legitimize interventions outside of the United Nations, but of how to make the
Security Council work better. In his view, the establishment of a code of conduct for the
Security Council could help. "The code would contain clear thresholds for what counted
as a humanitarian crisis requiring a Security Council response and an agreement of the P5
not to cast their veto in cases where [the majority of the Council favored intervention,
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unless] national security interests were at risk."113 The position was welcomed by the
commissioners for two reasons. First, considering concerns that had been raised,
Vedrine's idea provided a way to advance the complex debate. Second, the formula
"provided a neat link between the [Responsibility to Protect and criteria]: the Security
Council should be encumbered with a responsibility to protect and empowered to make
effective and timely decisions in the discharge of its responsibilities."114
Finally, broad consensus around three issues had emerged among commissioners
concerning the modalities of the Responsibility to Protect. First, the Responsibility to
Protect should encompass not only timely reaction, but also prevention strategies and
rebuilding efforts. Second, the Responsibility to Protect should ultimately focus on the
empowerment of local populations. Third, there was need for the creation of an "early
warning and response mechanism to alert the world to potential crises and to coordinate
responses."115
Once agreement on the basics of the concept was built among the commissioners,
the Beijing roundtable116 represented the last critical step in the potential development of
international consensus on the notion of the Responsibility to Protect. The challenge?
Chinese delegates focused on the issues at stake almost exclusively from a 'humanitarian
intervention' perspective.

The meeting opened with a paper which argued that humanitarian intervention was 'a total fallacy'
because it had no basis in law, being derived from a fallacious view of human rights as 'transcending'
sovereignty, and that its Western advocates had not seriously pursued a policy of protecting human rights.
113
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[Yet, as pointed out by Bellamy, all] was not lost[.] The Chinese went on to argue that, whilst humanitarian
intervention was fallacious, humanitarianism was not. In fact, humanitarianism was a 'lofty virtue' which
could be pursued through the Security Council.117

This last point was crucial. The commissioners could hope for gradual Chinese
support for the concept so long as the military dimension of the Responsibility to Protect
operated under Security Council approval.

6. 2 The Report's Contribution
The ICISS report entitled The Responsibility to Protect was presented to the world
on December 18, 2001. At its release, Paul Heinbecker "declared his confidence that 'the
thoughtfulness of this report, with its clear political and practical focus, provides a solid
basis for advancing this issue within the UN system'. "118
Based on the re-conceptualization of Sovereignty as Responsibility, as previously
developed by Francis Deng, the report stresses that states have the primary responsibility
to protect their populations from mass atrocities, and that in cases where states are unable
or unwilling to fulfill their responsibilities, the responsibility to protect is transferred to
the international community.
As emphasized by the ICISS co-chairs, reframing the debate in these terms offers
three specific advantages to solve the so called sovereignty-intervention dilemma. First,
this approach benefits those who need protection the most - the victims whose rights are
grossly violated in the context of internal conflicts, or who are being persecuted or
massacred by radical groups or state agents. Second, the concept is one that stresses
117
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national accountability. The primary responsibility lays with states "and the communities
and institutions within them."119 Only when states are unable or unwilling to protect their
populations, does the international community have a residual responsibility to intervene
to protect human beings, and to take measures to ameliorate the effects of potential crises.
Third, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect differs from that of humanitarian
intervention in the sense that it is not an open door for military action, but is broader, and
does not necessarily imply coercion.
As defined by the ICISS, the Responsibility to Protect comprises three
responsibilities: to prevent, to react, and to rebuild.120 Moreover, because preventing the
conditions that may lead to the commission of mass atrocities constitutes the most
effective strategy to avoid them in the first place, the ICISS report emphasizes that the
responsibility to prevent is "the single most important dimension"121 of the Responsibility
to Protect.
Yet, since the report focused most of its recommendations on the reactive
component of the framework,122 it "made it difficult for advocates to build international
support for"123 the final work of the ICISS. Nevertheless, the commissioner's work did
make a crucial contribution: its work resulted in reframing the debate in a way that
119
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potentially could generate broader international consensus. As Bellamy observes:

[The] deep-seated skepticism towards intervention did not necessarily translate into a rejection of
the underlying purpose of [the Responsibility to Protect] - the prevention and amelioration of genocide and
mass atrocities. Indeed in the commission's own consultations, there was a clear consensus on the
importance of shifting away from the non-consensual use of force to protect civilians, within a broader
continuum of measures, including prevention. The commission's adoption of a language focusing on the
rights of endangered civilians rather than on the rights of potential interveners helped to illuminate a broad
constituency of states and civil society actors prepared to acknowledge that sovereignty entailed
responsibilities and the legitimacy of international involvement in protecting people from genocide and
mass atrocities.124

As a consequence, as an expression, the Responsibility to Protect would survive.
However as we will see, its core principles, particularly those concerning the use of force,
would require important revisions.

124

Ibid.

42

Box 1
THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT:
PRINCIPLES FOR MILITARY INTERVENTION
(1)

THE JUST CAUSE THRESHOLD

Military intervention for human protection purposes is an exceptional and extraordinary measure.
To be warranted, there must be a serious harm occurring to human beings, or imminently likely to
occur, of the following kind:
A.
large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the
product either of deliberate state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state
situation; or
B.
large scale 'ethnic cleansing', actual or apprehended , whether carried out by killing,
forced expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
(2)

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLES

A.
Right intention: The primary purpose of the intervention, whatever other motives
intervening states may have, must be to halt or avert human suffering. Right intention is better
assured with multilateral operations, clearly supported by regional opinion and the victims
concerned.
B.
Last resort: Military intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for
the prevention or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored, with reasonable grounds for
believing lesser measures would not have succeeded.
C.
Proportional means: The scale, duration and intensity of the planned military intervention
should be the minimum necessary to secure the defined human protection objective.
D.
Reasonable prospects: There must be a reasonable chance of success in halting or
averting the suffering which has justified the intervention, with the consequences of action not
likely to be worse than the consequences of inaction.
(3)

RIGHT AUTHORITY

A.
There is no better or more appropriate body than the United Nations Security Council to
authorize military intervention for human protection purposes. The task is not to find alternatives
to the Security Council as a source of authority, but to make the Security Council work better than
it has.
B.
Security Council authorization should in all cases be sought prior to any military
intervention action being carried out. Those calling for an intervention should formally request
such authorization, or have the Council raise the matter on its own initiative, or have the
Secretary- General raise it under Article 99 of the UN Charter.
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C.
The Security Council should deal promptly with any request for authority to intervene where
there are allegations of large scale loss of human life or ethnic cleansing. It should in this context
seek adequate verification of facts on conditions on the ground that might support a military
intervention.
D.
The Permanent Five members of the Security Council should agree not to apply their veto
power, in matters where their vital state interests are not involved, to obstruct the passage of
resolutions authorizing military intervention for human protection purposes for which there is
otherwise majority support.
E.
If the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time,
alternative options are:
I. consideration of the matter by the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session under
the 'Uniting for Peace' procedure; and
II. action within area of jurisdiction by regional or sub-regional organizations under Chapter
VIII of the Charter, subject to their seeking subsequent authorization from the Security Council.
F.
The Security Council should take into account in all its deliberations that, if it fails to
discharge its responsibility to protect in conscience-shocking situations crying out for action,
concerned states may not rule out other means to meet the gravity and urgency of that situation - and
that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may suffer thereby.
(4)

OPERATIONAL PRINCIPLES

A.

Clear objectives; clear and unambiguous mandate at all times; and resources to match.

B.
Common military approach among involved partners, unity of command; clear and
unequivocal communications and chain of command.
C.
Acceptance of limitations, incrementalism and gradualism in the application of force, the
objective being protection of a population, not defeat of a state.
D.
Rules of engagement which fit the operational concept; are precise; reflect the principle of
proportionality; and involve total adherence to international humanitarian law.
E.

Acceptance that force protection cannot become the principal objective.

F.

Maximum possible coordination with humanitarian organizations.
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7. A Persistent but Flexible Effort
As soon as the ICISS released its report in late 2001, Canadian officials actively
began pursuing a double strategy aimed "to mobilize civil society to act both as advocate
and as agents of implementation, while at the same time leading an inter-governmental
process to gauge support for the [Responsibility to Protect], to identify political obstacles
and to build a group of 'like-minded' 'friends'."125 As seen by Canada, active engagement
in these areas provided the possibility to sell the emerging framework in two manners:
first, through a 'norm building approach', in which states could be persuaded to utilize
Responsibility to Protect language in declarations and resolutions; second, through an
'operationalisation approach', which implied to focus "on practical initiatives towards
increasing the physical protection of civilians."126
Responding to Canada's call, non-governmental organizations generated
important insights on best ways of advancing the framework.127 As seen by these actors,
it was crucial to stress the preventive dimension of the Responsibility to Protect. As
important, when considering that "operationalisation was likely to deliver more
consensus and actual protection,"128 it was imperative to advocate "for the commitment of
resources for conflict prevention and support for the development of international
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policing capacity and the mandates of UN representatives and advisers on protection
issues such as IDPs and the prevention of genocide."129
The second part of the Canadian strategy, aimed at direct engagement with
government officials, helped the Canadian government and other Responsibility to
Protect supporters to realize that although a majority of governments could be persuaded
to accept that states had the responsibility to protect their populations from mass
atrocities, it was necessary still to address governments' concerns on the potential
implications of the ICISS framework.
Security Council permanent members had expressed their concerns during the
Council's annual retreat in May, 2002. Uncertainty on the criteria to guide the use of
force was the main problem for the United States. As seen by the Bush administration,
American sovereign decisions on matters such as when and where to intervene could end
up being constrained. In turn, France and the United Kingdom expressed concerns about
the ability of criteria to generate political will on the part of Security Council members to
intervene when required. For this reason, as the ICISS's report, they argued that the use of
force in the absence of Security Council approval should not be condemned in all cases.
China expressed concerns in the opposite direction, stating that commitment to the letter
of the United Nations Charter was not negotiable: any question related to the use of force
was to be deferred to the Security Council only. Russia, as well as China, also stressed
the position that "the UN was already equipped to deal with humanitarian crisis."130
As for the G77, the group was also divided and "suggested that the report should
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be revised so as to emphasize the principles of territorial integrity and sovereignty."131
Finally, "[t]he Non Aligned Movement (NAM) flatly rejected"132 the Responsibility to
Protect. In the eyes of one its leading members, India, the problem at the Security
Council level during humanitarian emergencies was not a lack of authority to act, but a
lack of political will to act when necessary. As seen by Nirupam Sen:133

[The Responsibility to Protect] 'should be addressed with necessary caution and responsibility',
since 'we do not believe that discussions on the question should be used as a cover for conferring any
legitimacy on the so-called "right of humanitarian intervention" or making it the ideology of some kind of
"military humanism"'. 134

To make matters worse, the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 exacerbated negative
perceptions on the potential implications of the emerging framework. As pointed out by
Weiss, although humanitarian motives could "have been invoked [as a potential
justification for intervention] in March, 1988 - when Sadam used chemical weapons
against the Kurdish city of Halabja in northern Iraq, instantly killing 5,000 civilians - or
on numerous other occasions in the 1990s," that was clearly not the case in 2003. In
effect, only when the existence of weapons of mass destruction inside of Iraq proved
unsustainable, was the operation justified in humanitarian terms. 135
As posited by Bellamy, although it is impossible to judge the impact that the
event had on opponents of the framework, the incident did limit the terms of what
supporters of the Responsibility to Protect were prepared to advocate for. This was
131
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demonstrated "during a forum of social democratic political leaders" held on July 14,
2003, in which Argentina, Chile and Germany, "rejected sections of a draft communiqué
proposed by Tony Blair and Jean Chrétien [which contained] language clearly
reminiscent of"136 the Responsibility to Protect.137 Representatives from the three
countries opposed the draft's "wording, reportedly 'believing it could be used to justify
the military campaign in Iraq'."138
Nevertheless, the event led supporting governments to emphasize the necessity of
truly multilateral responses to potential humanitarian crises. For instance, in 2004,
Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder declared the commitment of the German government to
protecting endangered populations, stating that:

[W]hilst 'prevention does not rule out timely military intervention... this must be based on criteria
that are in keeping with our values and basic political convictions'. ['No country can guarantee security,
peace, and prosperity for itself and deal with the new challenges that face us by acting alone [...] German
security policy is based on the primacy of international law and the strengthening of the United Nations.'139

Considering these developments, NGO's suggestions, and the two failed attempts
to have the General Assembly discuss the work of the ICISS,140 Canadians began
promoting three major changes to the commission's framework: first, that approval of
non-consensual measures constituted a prerogative of the Security Council only; second,
"that the 'just cause' thresholds and precautionary principles should be viewed as
136
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constraints limiting governments' ability to 'abuse' humanitarian justifications[;]"141 142
third, and considering concerns of Council members, that it was necessary to stop
pushing for some of the measures that had being designed to make the Council work
better.143
By late 2004, "not even ardent supporters [of the framework] were advocating the
wholesale adoption of the commission's recommendations."144 Instead, key advocates
seemed determined to forge international consensus by "watering down the concept and
offering the world a new understanding of the [Responsibility to Protect]."145
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8. The Role of Kofi Annan, the High Level Panel and International Practice
Although negative dynamics between the United States and the United Nations
went back to 1994, when Republicans reached a majority in both houses of Congress, the
fact that the organization had been sidelined by Americans in 2003 not only had the
effect of questioning the relevance of the United Nations, but also of damaging further an
already tense relationship between Kofi Annan and the Bush administration. In an
interview given to BBC in September of that year, the Secretary General declared that in
the absence of Security Council approval, Iraq's invasion had been technically 'illegal'. In
turn, American officials, such as Randy Scheunemann,146 declared that the Secretary
General's behavior was outrageous. In his view, Annan "who ultimately [worked] for the
member states, [was trying to] supplant his judgment for the judgment of the members
[of the United Nations]."147
Annan shared his concerns in his address to the General Assembly on September
23, 2003. After reminding member states about the shared vision "of global solidarity and
collective security" that was agreed to in the Millennium Declaration of 2000, and about
the rules of the collective security system as established in the United Nations Charter,
the Secretary General told his audience:

Now we must decide whether it is possible to continue on the basis agreed [in 1945], or whether
radical changes are needed. And we must not shy away from questions about the adequacy, and
effectiveness, of the rules and instruments at our disposal. Among those instruments, none is more
important that the Security Council itself[.] The Council needs to consider how it will deal with the
possibility that individual States may use force 'pre-emptively' against perceived threats [and] need to begin
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a discussion on the criteria for an early authorization of coercive measures to address certain types of
threats.148 [Also crucial, Council members] still need to engage in serious discussions of the best way to
respond to threats of genocide or other comparable massive violations of human rights[.] Once again this
year, our collective response to events of this type - in the Democratic Republic of Congo, and in Liberia has been hesitant and tardy.149

As pointed out by Annan, in order to confront collective challenges, not only the
Security Council but many bodies of the United Nations needed to be revised and
possibly reformed.150 To this aim, the Secretary General informed member states of his
intention of establishing a High Level Panel (HLP) of experts which would focus on four
tasks:

First, to examine the current challenges to peace and security[.] Second, to consider the
contribution which collective action can make in addressing these challenges[.] Third, to review the
functioning of the major organs of the United Nations and the relationship within them[.] Fourth, to
recommend ways of strengthening the United Nations, through reform of its institutions and processes.151

Among many relevant recommendations, the Report of the HLP on Threats,
Challenges and Change, entitled A More Secured World: Our Shared Responsibility,152
both "endorsed the 'emerging norm that there is a responsibility to protect', and confirmed
the developing consensus that this norm was 'exercisable by the Security Council'."153
In order to improve the performance of the Security Council, the HLP reiterated
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two ICISS recommendations - the just cause thresholds, and the precautionary principles.
Yet, the HLP clarified possible causes that could trigger international reaction in two
ways. First, by adding 'serious violations to international humanitarian law' to the list that
already contained crimes such as genocide, large scale killing and ethnic cleansing.
Second, by "insisting that the criteria would be satisfied if the threat was actual or
'imminently apprehended' - as opposed to simply 'apprehended', as the ICISS had
proposed."154 In addition, the HLP renamed the precautionary principles and advised
Council members to adopt them as 'guidelines for the use of force' through a declaratory
resolution. Finally, as had been advocated by other supporters, the HLP dropped the P5
code of conduct. Instead, it recommended the adoption of an indicative voting system, in
which Security Council members "could call for states to declare themselves publicly and
to justify their positions prior to an actual vote."155
Kofi Annan endorsed most of the HLP recommendations in his own report for
United Nations reform. In Larger Freedom156 reiterated the idea that states had the
primary responsibility to protect their populations, and that only in cases where states
proved unable or unwilling to fulfill their obligations, the Security Council had the
authority to approve enforcement operations. Perhaps the most important contribution of
Annan's proposal was to place his recommendations in the section on the rule of law,
while leaving the HLP guidelines for Security Council action in the section related to the
use of force.157 As seen by the Secretary General, the move was justified because it
highlighted the preventive facet of the emerging framework, thus distancing the
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Responsibility to Protect from the idea of military intervention.
Although the endorsement by the HLP and the Secretary General were crucial for
introducing the Responsibility to Protect to the General Assembly agenda, existing
international practice - which involved the gradual operationalisation of Responsibility to
Protect related principles - was also determinant for facilitating international consensus
on the revised framework. In effect, since 1998 Security Council members had been
working on how to incorporate the protection of civilians during armed conflicts in
peacekeeping mandates. As a consequence, by 2005, when the United Nations reform
package was being negotiated by member states, "[n]ot only the UN had established itself
[at the center of civilian protection efforts], but some of those states most skeptical about
the [Responsibility to Protect,]158 had made a physical contribution to protection through
their involvement in UN peace operations."159
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9. Making it to the International Agenda
Considering that on September of 2005 world leaders would gather at the United
Nations to express their positions on the issues that Annan's reform package had raised,
Jean Ping, Foreign Minister of Gabon, and then President of the General Assembly,
began inquiring about countries postures on the Secretary General's proposals in late
2004. In general, when consulted on the point of the Responsibility to Protect, permanent
delegations had expressed support for a declaration that would recognize that states had
the primary responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocities. Yet, there
were also various concerns and opposing positions.
Security Council members had expressed opposition to a code of conduct to be
followed by the P5, as it had been recommended by the ICISS. On the issue of the right
authority, contrary to the Chinese delegation's argument that Security Council
authorization was an imperative, the United States and the United Kingdom held that if
operations were based on legitimate purposes, they should not be ruled out by member
states. On the proposed guidelines for decision-making, '[w]hereas several African states,
the [HLP] and Annan endorsed criteria as essential to making the Security Council's
decisions more transparent, accountable (to the wider membership) and hence legitimate,
the US, China and Russia opposed them."160 Lastly, a small group of states led by India
argued that accepting the Responsibility to Protect implied the risk of legitimizing an
'intervener's charter'.
As Bellamy tells us, although careful negotiation with delegations had led to
significant improvements in the draft document by early August, the appointment of John
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Bolton,161 as the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, with only
three weeks to go until the Summit proved quasi-disastrous.
Despite the fact that Bolton's observations on the Responsibility to Protect could
have been accommodated in Pings draft,162 his call for a complete revision of the
document, and for the removal of "all references to the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs), the 'right to development' and the goal of the debt reduction[,]"163 had the effect
of destabilizing the emerging consensus. In effect, the episode not only had the effect of
shaking the position of some G77 countries - since the block had negotiated incorporating
Responsibility to Protect language into Ping's draft so long as Western nations agreed to
commit themselves to development related matters - but also, of sparkling negative
reactions from China and Russia, which began reversing to previous positions by stating
that the United Nations was already prepared to deal with humanitarian crises.
Yet, four factors were determinative for reversing the dynamics. First, advocacy
efforts by key African and Latin American countries were persistent and demonstrated
that support for the Responsibility to Protect did not come only from Western nations.
Second, "last minute personal diplomacy [efforts] with major wavering-country leaders
by Canadian Prime Minister Paul Martin"164 were successful. Third, despite Bolton's
position, Ping and members of the Secretariat had continued to work on the draft
proposal which they distributed to permanent delegations three days ahead of the
161
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Summit. Finally, United Nations complaints about the position of the American
delegation were heard by Secretary of State Rice, who reversed Bolton's stance and
declared the United States delegation's support for the final draft.
In the end, persistent efforts and careful diplomacy proved successful, since on
September 16, 2005, while gathered in New York to celebrate the 60th anniversary of the
United Nations, world leaders unanimously endorsed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the
World Summit Outcome Document. As agreed by member states:

138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes,
including their incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will
act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate, encourage and help states to
exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing early warning capability.

139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the responsibility to use
appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII
of the Charter, to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against
humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner,
through the Security Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case
basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be
inadequate and national authorities manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes,
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue
consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international
law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to
assisting those which are under stress before crises and conflict break out.
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Although non-binding in nature, the declaration is remarkable, not only because it
is extremely clear both when it reaffirms the fact that state authorities have the primary
responsibility to protect their populations from mass atrocity crimes and, when it
validates the authority of the Security Council to authorize operations for human
protection purposes, so long as peaceful means prove inadequate, and national authorities
manifestly fail to protect their populations, but also, because it stresses prevention and
recognizes the legitimate role of the United Nations to assist states in meeting their
obligations. Crucially, "paragraphs 138 and 139, [began] to point to the kind of tools,
actors and procedures that could form the basis for operationalizing [Responsibility to
Protect] principles."165
Yet, as demonstrated by initial 'revolts' against the implementation of the concept
during the 2006-2007 period by China, at the Security Council level, and by Sudan, both
concerning the Darfur crisis ,166 one thing was to proclaim the Responsibility to Protect as
a universal principle, and something very different was to agree on how to translate the
noble declaration into international practice. Fortunately, "[p]romising signs began to
emerge [...] with the election of South Korean foreign minister, Ban Ki-moon as UN
Secretary General in October 2006[,]"167 and with the appointment of Edward Luck, in
February of 2008, as Ban's Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect.
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10. Clarifying the Concept
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon proposed the creation of the position of the
Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect on December of 2007. As explained to
member states, initially, the new adviser was "to provide recommendations about
implementing the 2005 World Summit Agreement."168 Yet, in the long term, his work
was to complement the work of Francis Deng as his Special Adviser on the Prevention of
Genocide, as "Deng [would focus] on responding to emerging crises and [the Special
Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect] on addressing longer term policy and reform
challenges."169 To facilitate the process, Ban also proposed the "establishment of a joint
office for the Responsibility to Protect and for the Prevention of Genocide."
Although the Secretary General's suggestions initially were rejected by the
General Assembly indirectly, when its Fifth Committee "adopted a resolution on the
2007/8 budget without funding for Ban's proposal[,]"170 the appointment of Edward Luck
as his Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect, in early 2008,171 and his adoption
of a consultative approach towards member states "based on a detailed dissection of the
2005 agreement,"172 represented an important turning point for the negative perceptions
on the potential implications of the emerging framework that had been building up since
2005.
In effect, constructive engagement with delegations resulted in developing
important conceptual clarifications. Among others, that the Responsibility to Protect, as
conceived by member states, comprised three non-sequential but equally important
168
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pillars. Also, that although the object of the Responsibility to Protect was 'narrow' - thus
applicable only to the ongoing obligations of states to protect their populations from
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity - a comprehensive
approach to potential and ongoing crises by the international community needed to be
'deep' - thus including "the whole prevention and protection toolkit available to the
United Nations system, regional arrangements, states, and civil society."173
Despite the fact that the Secretary General's approach was criticized by
commentators like Ramesh Thakur because it stress "prevention, capacity-building, and
the primary responsibility of states rather than the dilemmas associated with humanitarian
intervention,"174 Ban and his team insisted that in order to secure international support for
the Responsibility to Protect, the role of the General Assembly in advancing the
framework was crucial.
In their view, "all member states [needed to have] the opportunity to examine the
principle and comment on its implementation. What might be lost in terms of momentum,
they rationalized, would be more than compensated for in terms of legitimacy if the
principle was moved forward on the basis of consensus."175 On this basis, the 2009
Secretary General's Report to the General Assembly, entitled Implementing the
Responsibility to Protect,176 began by clarifying the nature and scope of the emerging
framework, to later identify possible avenues that could help implementing the 2005
agreement.
After demonstrating that, as conceived by member states, the responsibility of
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states to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity constituted a reaffirmation of existing legal obligations, and that the
various ways of implementing the framework that could be identified in the 2005
agreement were concordant with the principles and procedures set up in the United
Nations Charter, the 2009 report went ahead and analyzed in detail the Responsibility to
Protect as conceived by member states.
Crucial "in terms of the principle's conceptual development, [were] the idea[s]
that the [Responsibility to Protect] comprises three pillars"177 - state responsibility,
international assistance and timely response - and that Responsibility to Protect principles
were not aimed at destroying sovereignty as an institution, but at reinforcing its content.
Such an understanding, concordant with the re-conceptualization of 'sovereignty as
individual and shared responsibility' developed by Deng during the mid-nineties, not only
explains why the emerging framework defines the responsibility of states to protect their
populations from mass atrocity crimes and their incitement, as the 'bedrock' of the
Responsibility to Protect, but also why the framework "focuses on helping states succeed
(pillar two), [and] not just on reacting when states fail (pillar three)."178 Once these points
were made, the 2009 report continued by identifying different avenues that could
facilitate the implementation of the framework, both in the short and the long term.
Analyzing the first pillar of the Responsibility to Protect - or the primary
responsibility of states to protect their populations from mass atrocities and their
incitement, as proclaimed in paragraph 138 of the World Summit Outcome Document179-
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the 2009 report of the Secretary General explains that although states could approach the
task of protecting populations in diverse manners, existent research pointed to the
promotion and protection of basic rights, and the existence of mechanisms to facilitate the
management of diversity, as crucial factors to facilitate effective protection of
populations.
Accordingly, in addition to calling for needed research and analysis on pressing
issues, such as "why one society plunges into mass violence while its neighbors remain
relatively stable, and on why it has been so difficult to stem widespread and systematic
sexual violence in some places[,]"180 the 2009 Report recommends to member states to
consider various initiatives that could facilitate the development of a culture of
prevention at the level of individual states. Among others:

•

The UN Human Rights Council could be used to encourage states to meet their [Responsibility to
Protect] obligations and the Council's Universal Peer Review (UPR) mechanism could be utilized
to monitor their performance.

•

States should become parties to the relevant instruments of human rights law, as well as to the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC). They should also incorporate this law into
domestic jurisdiction and implement it faithfully.

•

In addition to acceding to the Rome Statute, states should also do more to assist the ICC and other
international tribunals by, for example, locating and apprehending indictees.

•

[Responsibility to Protect] principles should be localized into each culture and society so that they
are owned and acted upon by communities and not seen as external impositions.

•

States, even stable ones, should ensure that they have mechanisms in place to deal with bigotry,

responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance to it."
180
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intolerance, racism and exclusion. 181

Analyzing the second pillar of the Responsibility to Protect, the 2009 report of the
Secretary General argues that as proclaimed in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the World
Summit Outcome Document182 "the commitment of the international community to assist
states in meeting [their] obligations"183 could be exercised in four distinct manners: by
encouraging states to meet their responsibilities; by helping states in exercising their
responsibilities; by helping states in building needed protection capacities; and by
assisting states "under stress before the conflicts break out."184
After explaining that a pre-condition for exercising pillar two measures is "the
consent and cooperation of the host state,"185 and reminding member states that in cases
where national authorities are determined to commit or facilitate the commission of mass
atrocities, there is little that pillar two measures can accomplish, the 2009 report
recommends specific measures on each of the second pillar's facets:

•

Encouraging states to meet their pillar one responsibilities:
- Those inciting or planning to commit the four crimes need to be made aware that they will be

held to account.
- Incentives should be offered to encourage parties towards reconciliation.
•

Helping them to exercise this responsibility:
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- Security sector reform aimed at building and sustaining legitimate and effective security forces
makes an important contribution to maintaining stability and provides states with the capacity to
respond quickly and legitimately to emerging problems.
•

Helping them to build their capacity to protect:
- Targeted economic development assistance would assist in preventing the four crimes by

reducing inequalities, improving education, giving the poor a stronger voice, and increasing political
participation.
- International assistance should help states and societies to build the specific capacities they need
[to] prevent genocide and mass atrocities.
•

Assisting states 'under stress before crises and conflicts break out:
- The UN and regional and subregional organizations could build rapidly deployable civilian and

police capacities to help countries under stress.
- Where the four crimes are committed by non-state actors, international military assistance to the
state may be the most effective form of assistance.186

Analyzing the third pillar of the Responsibility to Protect - or the responsibility of
the international community to respond in a timely and decisive manner when states are
manifestly failing to protect their populations - the 2009 report of the Secretary General
explains that in terms of strategy, as stated in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome
Document, "pillar three comprises two steps. [First,] the international community,
through the United Nations[,] has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic,
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance of Chapter VI and VIII of the
Charter, to help protect populations"187 from mass atrocity crimes. Second, and so long as
peaceful means prove inadequate, and "national authorities are manifestly failing to
protect their populations[, the international community has the responsibility to take
186
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collective] action, through the Security Council, including enforcement measures under
Chapter VII of the Charter."188
Stressing the fact that military operations for protection purposes constitute only
one of the measures that could be authorized by Council members, the 2009 report points
to several ways in which the international community could exercise the last pillar of the
Responsibility to Protect:

•

The Security Council might use targeted sanctions on travel, financial transfers, and luxury goods,
and arms embargos. In such cases, it is incumbent on the Security Council, relevant regional
organizations and individual states to develop the expertise, capacity and political will necessary
to properly implement these regimes.

•

The permanent members of the Security Council should refrain from using their veto in situations
of manifest failure and should act in good faith to reach a consensus on exercising the Council's
responsibility in such cases.

•

Member states may want to consider developing principles, rules and doctrine to guide the use of
force for humanitarian purposes.

•

The UN should strengthen its capacities for the rapid deployment of military personnel, including
by developing doctrine and training and resolving command and control issues.

•

The UN should strengthen its partnerships with regional organizations to facilitate rapid
cooperation.189

Lastly, the report also reminded member states of the fact that "the 2005
agreement contained a specific commitment to strengthen UN's capacity for early
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warning"190 and reiterated Ban's "call for the establishment of a Joint Office for the
Prevention of Genocide and [the Responsibility to Protect].191
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11. A Productive Debate
The first formal consideration of the Responsibility to Protect at the General
Assembly level began on July 21, 2009, when Secretary General Ban Ki-moon presented
Implementing the Responsibility to Protect to the wide membership of the United
Nations. Although the move was criticized by some Responsibility to Protect supporters
who feared "that a General Assembly debate could 'provide the opportunity for skeptical
governments to renegotiate' [the 2005 Agreement,]"192 Ban's team remained cautious yet
optimistic, since careful analysis of countries' positions showed, that "governments in the
Asia-Pacific region, long thought the region most resistant to [the Responsibility to
Protect], were quite open to the principle and endorsed the Secretary-General's
approach[.]"193
Tensions raised when Miguel d'Escoto, Nicaraguan Ambassador to the United
Nations and then President of the General Assembly, did his best to influence his peers
against Ban's proposed framework for better understanding and implementing the 2005
agreement. Not only did he withhold the Responsibility to Protect as much as he could
from the General Assembly's agenda, he was uncooperative with the Secretariat on
establishing a date for the debate that would be compatible with Ban's schedule, but he
also arranged for "an 'Interactive Informal Dialogue on the Responsibility to Protect' on
the morning of [July 23,] immediately prior to the GA debate."194 For the event, d' Escoto
invited four panelists, two of them outright critics of the Responsibility to Protect, and
distributed a 'concept note' which argued against the framework and posited that
'colonialism and interventionism used responsibility to protect arguments'. Lastly,
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d'Escoto appointed Nerupem Sen, former Indian Ambassador to the United Nations and a
manifest detractor of the framework, "as his special adviser on [the Responsibility to
Protect]."195
Fortunately, the "efforts [of the President of the General Assembly] failed and the
2009 General Assembly debate vindicated [Ban and his advisers'] cautious,"196 but
optimistic stance, since 90 of the 94 speakers who took the floor on the occasion representing as many as 180 countries and two observer missions - welcomed the
Responsibility to Protect as interpreted by the 2009 report. This was an impressive
accomplishment considering that only four countries - Cuba, Nicaragua, Venezuela and
Sudan - expressed their support for a revision of the 2005 agreement.
Perhaps one of the most significant part of the debate was the identification by
member states of "key measures that [could] be taken to prevent mass atrocity crimes."197
In effect. based on the premise that state responsibility constitutes the 'bedrock' of the
Responsibility to Protect, countries such as Austria, Colombia and Japan "stressed the
importance of good governance, the rule of law [...] and a functioning law-enforcement
and justice system," as well as the necessity of states becoming parties to relevant human
rights and humanitarian conventions and treaties, including the Rome Statute. In turn,
South Korea stressed the crucial value of conflict management mechanisms at the
domestic level, and the importance of promoting national dialogue as well as periodic
country risk assessments. "The Holy See argued for national policies that fostered greater
protection of religious, racial and ethnic minorities." Countries such as Bolivia and
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Azerbaijan, also stressed the importance of measures aimed to end impunity, such as
prosecution for those responsible for mass atrocity crimes.
Commenting on the need for strengthening early warning capacities, the United
States and Azerbaijan underscored the importance of further analysis on the factors that
can lead to the commission of mass atrocities. Complementing the position, Armenia,
Chile and Israel stressed the need for governments themselves, as well as for the
international community, to pay attention to warning signs. In turn, the United States
pointed to the need for "'effective UN human rights machinery, including 'more credible
action from the Human Rights Council and timely information on unfolding and potential
calamities from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and the network
for Independent UN Rapporteurs and Experts'."198 Countries such as Armenia, Canada,
Chile, Croatia, Leichtenstein, Slovenia and South Korea also stressed the crucial role to
be played by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. Some of these countries
also underscored the need for strengthening the position of the Special Adviser on the
Responsibility to Protect.
Many states199 also stressed the importance of improving existing mediation
capacities and called for a bigger allocation of resources to the area. The European Union
underscored the relevance of developing mediation capacities at the local level.
Illustrating the utility of these types of measures, Timor-Leste shared its experience as a
recipient of "valuable assistance [...] in building local mediation and conflict resolution
capacities."200 For its part, the United States called for the need of further strengthening
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United Nations mediation standby teams, and publicly recognized their invaluable
contributions.
Approximately 60 states underscored the importance of regional organizations in
supporting the emerging framework. Countries such as Sierra Leone, South Africa and
Ghana called for greater cooperation and support from the United Nations with African
organizations such as the African Union (AU) and the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS). In turn, Sierra Leone pointed to institutional and operational
advances such as "Africa's Continental and Early Warning Systems, the AU Panel of the
Wise, and the building of a 15-20,000 strong African Standby Force (ASF) as the most
effective ways of enhancing the continent's capacity to address African problems at the
sub-regional level."201 The European Union also underscored the importance of regional
organizations' various instruments to assist states in building capacities "in areas of
conflict prevention, development and human rights, good governance, rule of law and
judicial and security sector reform."202 The Philippines called for greater support from the
United Nations in helping build civilian capacities at the regional and sub-regional level
and pointed to "the potential value of region-to-region learning processes and their
adaptation to local conditions and cultures."203 Lastly, South Korea stressed the urgency
of incorporating Responsibility to Protect related criteria into peer review mechanisms at
the regional level.
Countries such as Uruguay, Luxembourg and the Solomon Islands also
highlighted the possibility of a stronger role to be played by the Peacebuilding
Commission (PBC). In turn, "Nigeria noted the role of the African Union Framework for
201
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Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development as a complement of the PBC."204 Lastly,
Jordan argued that the General Assembly should contribute in strengthening the
Responsibility to Protect by focusing not only on the potential role to be played by the
PBC, but also by the Economic and Social Council and the Human Rights Council.
In the end, although the debate clearly identified that there are still areas of
concern for some states, such as the issue of selectivity and double standards, the need for
a more representative and effective Security Council, and the potential for the
Responsibility to Protect to be abused by powerful states, it also revealed a deepening
consensus or common understanding on six points:

First, the [Responsibility to Protect] is a universal principle [to be applied at all times and all
places.] Second, the [Responsibility to Protect] lies first and foremost with the state[.] Third, the
[Responsibility to Protect] applies only to the four crimes and their prevention. Fourth, the [Responsibility
to Protect] must be implemented and exercised in a manner consistent with international law and the UN
Charter[.] Fifth, measures related to the [Responsibility to Protect] third pillar include more than simply
coercion or the use of force[.] Finally, prevention is the most important element of the [Responsibility to
Protect].205
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12. Contributions, Pending Challenges and Limitations of the Responsibility to
Protect
In "The Responsibility to Protect - Five Years On," Bellamy provides us with an
assessment of the effectiveness of the Responsibility to Protect during the 2005-2010
period. After analyzing a series of cases "in which he believes [that the Responsibility to
Protect] was either used too little (Somalia), used ineffectively (Darfur) or employed
effectively (Kenya),"206 and accepting that it is perhaps to early to tell, Bellamy
demonstrates that, to-date, the ability of the framework to provide effective results on the
ground is at best mixed. In the article, Bellamy also elaborates on various issues which
seem specially relevant for my argument in this section, since they refer to the
relationship between the Responsibility to Protect and greater compliance with
international law.
In building his argument, Bellamy tells us that the Responsibility to Protect "is
commonly conceptualized as fulfilling two functions, but that the two are not
complementary."207 The author argues that one cannot sustain that the Responsibility to
Protect represents at the same time a "political commitment to prevent and halt genocide
and mass atrocities accompanied by a policy agenda in need of implementation,"208 209
and "a speech act and catalyst for action,"210 211 because the Responsibility to Protect
represents a universal principle, applicable at all times, and in all places, and not "a label
that can be attached to particular crises."212
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Bellamy also tells us that although there seems to be consensus in conceptualizing
the Responsibility to Protect as a norm,213 there is less clarity "on what sort of norm it
is."214 According to the author, although it is clear that the Responsibility to Protect's first
pillar215 is to be understood as a reaffirmation of existing legal obligations, the normative
status of pillars two and three216 are somehow questionable, since these dimensions "are
weakened by the problem of indeterminacy."217
Bellamy then reminds us of the varied but ineffective and weak responses of the
international community to humanitarian crises which occurred between 2005 and 2010
in countries like Sudan and Somalia, and advances the argument that while during the
2005 World Summit states may have agreed that something is to be done in this type of
cases, the fact that the international community has a "relatively free hand to what [is to
be done,] severely restricts [the Responsibility to Protect's] compliance-pull, and hence
its ability to encourage states to find consensus and commit additional resources to the
protection of civilians."218 Explaining the situation, Bellamy affirms that "the more
precise a norm indicates the behavior it expects in a given situation, the stronger its
compliance pull."
Finally, commenting on the contributions of the framework, Bellamy goes back to
the first 'function' of the Responsibility to Protect. After reminding us that "[t]he further
upstream we go in terms of structural prevention, the more difficult it is to demonstrate

213

As Luck tells us, for his analysis, Bellamy adopts Finnemore and Sikking's conceptualization of norms
that defines them as "shared expectations of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity."
Luck 2010, p. 359.
214
Bellamy 2010, p. 160.
215
State responsibility.
216
International assistance and timely and decisive response.
217
Bellamy 2010, 161.
218
Ibid, p.162.

72

[the Responsibility to Protect's] impact[,]"219 and of pointing to cases220 where "a
combination of international observation and engagement"221 seemed to have a positive
effect on the behavior of relevant actors, since mass atrocities did not follow from
national confrontations, Bellamy concludes:

Given that indeterminacy makes it unlikely that [the Responsibility to Protect] will act in the near
future as a catalyst for international action in response to genocide and mass atrocities, it seems reasonable
to argue that the most prudent path is to view the principle as a policy agenda in need of implementation
rather than as a 'red flag' to galvanize the world into action. This view would certainly be consistent with
the evidence thus far that [the Responsibility to Protect] is best employed as a diplomatic tool, or prism, to
guide efforts to stem the tide of mass atrocities, and that it has little utility in terms of generating additional
international political will in response to such episodes.222

Yet, Bellamy's line of reasoning seems problematic not only because "on an
operational plane [the two functions of the Responsibility to Protect]223 need not to be
incompatible, if pursued in reasonable proportions and if it is understood that a call to
action does not necessarily refer to military and coercive action,"224 but because it also
ignores cases such as Kenya, where structural prevention failed,225 yet where
international action through mediation, was successful in reversing the situation.
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Furthermore, because Bellamy bases his line of reasoning on an erroneous
understanding not only of what is the Responsibility to Protect but also of the way
international law functions, his whole analysis concerning what should be expected from
the developing framework seems flawed. In effect, as it has been stressed by the current
Secretary General and his advisers, the Responsibility to Protect "does not seek to add
new norms or standards"226 to the ones contained in existing international agreements,227
but instead, to provide individual states and the international community with a
comprehensive strategy able to integrate a "coherent set of ideas for implementing"
foundational norms and related principles228 of the Responsibility to Protect within the
terms of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document.
Moreover, in understanding the commitment of the international community to
assist and support states in fulfilling their obligations, and under certain circumstances to
act collectively, it is basic to keep in mind two facts that are crucial in terms of what
should be expected from the Responsibility to Protect. First, that as agreed by member
states, timely and decisive action is to be decided by the Secretary General, if measures
are pacific, or through processes at the regional and global levels that take place on
political bodies such as the African Union Peace and Security Council229 and the United
Nations Security Council "where there is no automaticity or rigid template demanding a
particular course of action."230 Second, that international assistance and response "cannot
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require a successful outcome [since] there is no certain way of knowing beforehand
which course of action will make the most positive difference."231
Furthermore, concerning the compliance-pull that the framework can generate
when utilized as a speech act, it is clear that the issue is not if "the invocation of [the
Responsibility to Protect] exerts no pull"232 233 but if this is sufficient. This point brings
us back to what should be expected from international law, since "[i]f we expect norms,
standards and principles to be respected and implemented all the time[,] then we would
not have any." In addition, as correctly posited by Luck, "compliance tends to deepen
over time [as standards of behavior which are characterized by] important aspirational
qualities, [are] emulated and attained over time."234
So, if the Responsibility to Protect is not a norm, what is it, and what are its
contributions, pending challenges and limitations? Considering its non-binding nature,
and the fact that the Responsibility to Protect "represents a shared understanding or
consensus about procedure among"235 member states - in the sense that there is
"[a]greement that something ought to be done when an important international standard
has been breached in unacceptable ways"236 - it seems fair to conceptualize the
framework as a soft law mechanism aimed at facilitating compliance with previously
agreed-to standards of behavior. In other words, what the Responsibility to Protect
"brings to existing norms on genocide prevention, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and
crimes against humanity, in fact, is the nucleus of a multilateral compliance
231
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mechanism."237 Seen in this light, it is easier to understand why it is that the main
contribution of the framework is not really legal, but political, since what the 2005
agreement actually does is add "a universal and high-level political dimension that the
struggle against genocide has sorely lacked over the past six decades."238

[Yet it is basic to keep in mind that the] status quo gives way slowly, sometimes painfully slowly,
at the United Nations. But it does give way with time and sustained effort[.] No doubt the first two pillars the preventive or upstream end of [the Responsibility to Protect] will become standard operating procedure
for the UN system and its partners well before the third pillar. The first two pillars, with their stress on
prevention, capacity-building and rebuilding, early warning and global regional collaboration, face little
political opposition. Here the challenge is more institutional and intellectual - figuring out what needs to be
done, how to do it, and who should do it - than political. The implementation of the third pillar, mounting a
'timely and decisive' response when a state is 'manifestly failing to protect its population, will come more
slowly and unevenly.239

This last point takes us to the limitations not only of the Responsibility to Protect
but of international law in general. In this point it is useful to go back to Diehl et al. who
explain that:

The tenuous relationship between international law and international politics has created a barrier
to understanding the conditions that make international law effective. As a factor in ordering international
relations, international law manages the challenges of global governance generated by power, politics, and
natural phenomena through system-wide change and adaptation. To perform effectively, international law
requires that three elements be in alignment:
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•

the existence of a legal concept that is sufficiently developed to be communicated clearly;

•

the availability of a structure or framework that can support the operation of the law;

•

the political consensus and will of the system's members to use the law.240

In effect, not only is the Responsibility to Protect part of a bigger process, but
"ultimately[,] it is all about political will,"241 and this is not only from the perspective of
government authorities who are supposed to protect their populations from mass
atrocities and their incitement, but from neighbors, sub-regional and regional
organizations, as well as from relevant bodies of the United Nations. Yet it is important
to keep in mind that the framework is still developing and, as it was stated earlier, that its
most important contribution is its political dimension. In other words, although the
possibility of breaking the law, or the P5 using their veto power is a reality, they may
become "an increasingly unattractive recourse"242 as the legitimacy of the framework,
derived both from increasing global consensus, and from the gradual operationalisation of
its related principles and components, are "likely to raise political costs"243 of violations,
and of blocking timely and decisive action, when states manifestly fail to protect their
populations.
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